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Abstract  
Scholars of legal mobilization have long explored how litigation is used 
as a resource for social and political change. While most studies focus on the 
actions of private groups, this article considers law enforcement as a form of 
legal mobilization. Employing a case study of recent pharmaceutical litigation, 
this article examines how prosecutors have mobilized the law to reshape 
corporate responsibilities in the prescription drug industry. Prosecutors' 
litigation campaigns have forced changes in organizational practices, 
expanded the scope of the conflict over pharmaceutical industry actions, and 
established new legal norms that have spread throughout the political system. 
This form of prosecutor-led legal mobilization has occurred in other contexts 
as well, including gun control and mortgage lending. In addition to indicating 
how lawyers within the state can engage in a form of cause lawyering, the 
government litigation explored in this article illustrates both the instrumental 
and constitutive power of the law. 
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Introduction  
The mobilization of law for social and political reform has long 
been a central topic in the study of law and society (Zemans 1983; 
Epp 1998; Albiston 1999; Barnes & Burke 2012). Studies of legal 
mobilization have typically focused on how private individuals and 
groups, such as civil rights and environmental organizations, use legal 
resources against the state. This focus reflects the "bottom-up" 
approach to the study of law employed by numerous legal mobilization 
studies (McCann 1994; Ewick & Silbey 1998; Paris 2010). While these 
studies often adopt a narrative of private groups against the state, 
however, powerful legal actors within the state have also mobilized the 
law in ways mirroring the efforts of social movements. These efforts 
have transformed existing political arrangements and reshaped 
corporate practices in order to address policy demands left unmet by 
other parts of the state.  
In this article, I consider how government prosecutors, 
especially state attorneys general and their federal counterparts in the 
U.S. Department of Justice, have employed litigation as a form of legal 
mobilization. My examination centers on a substantively important, 
though little studied, recent litigation campaign: government litigation 
against the pharmaceutical industry. Over several years, state and 
federal prosecutors succeeded in re-framing widely accepted 
pharmaceutical industry practices into what policymakers and the 
public now perceive as a massive fraudulent conspiracy operated by 
drug companies. This effort, arising in an era of growing concern about 
health care costs, was a reaction to congressional unwillingness to 
change the way the government paid for prescription drugs through 
Medicare and Medicaid. By using innovative legal arguments, 
prosecutors employed the law to achieve significant nationwide 
changes throughout the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry. 
While this article focuses mainly on pharmaceutical litigation, legal 
mobilization by government prosecutors is a phenomenon that has 
appeared in several other contemporary contexts. Near the conclusion, 
I draw attention to two additional cases, gun control and reform of 
mortgage lending practices, which have followed patterns similar to 
that of the pharmaceutical litigation.  
Government-led litigation is of interest to socio-legal scholars 
for several reasons. For one, this study suggests that law enforcement 
can be an important form of legal mobilization. Apart from the role of 
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public prosecutors in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, which spurred 
several important studies (Mather 1998; Derthick 2001; McCann, 
Haltom & Fisher 2013), scholars have generally overlooked 
government litigation as a political reform strategy. This is largely 
because mobilization studies tend to focus on non-state actors and 
because government litigation campaigns have unfolded over long 
periods rather than being resolved in landmark court cases. By tracing 
a sustained reform-oriented litigation campaign by public prosecutors, 
my article contributes to recent scholarship examining the role of 
activist government lawyers (Berenson 2009; NeJaime 2012) and 
responds to calls that greater attention be paid to complex litigation 
and mobilization by powerful actors (McCann 2008:535).  
The activity examined in this article also illustrates that the 
distinction between "outsider" groups seeking to reform institutions 
and the "insiders" residing within those organizations is often blurred. 
While previous law and society scholarship has emphasized this point 
(Katzenstein 1998), most studies of "institutional insiders" who 
attempt to reform their own organizations focus on non-state insiders 
such as those within corporations (Raeburn 2004) and schools (Binder 
2002). Meanwhile, the relationship between government actors and 
outsider activism is typically discussed in terms of "elite alliances" or 
elite support (McCann 1994). "The state" typically appears as a 
monolithic actor that reacts with varying levels of support or resistance 
to pressure from outsider movements. This article suggests, however, 
that the role of government actors in the process of legal mobilization 
can stretch beyond simply providing "support" for outsider movements 
by initiating challenges to other parts of the state to which they 
belong. These challenges often enlist other allies within the state – 
especially federal agencies – but do so in the context of challenging 
existing government policy. This helps illustrate that the role of "the 
state" in processes of legal mobilization is more complex and 
differentiated than often portrayed.  
Further, government-driven legal mobilization illustrates the 
effectiveness of law-based reform, in contrast to scholarly skeptics 
(Rosenberg 1991, 2008). Prosecutors' use of the law has altered the 
political status quo in numerous direct and indirect ways, significantly 
affecting the practices of several of America's largest industries. 
Prosecutors have used threats of lawsuits to reach settlements with 
industry defendants that create regulatory requirements not otherwise 
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required under existing law. This litigation has also served to alter the 
political status quo in more subtle ways, including reshaping existing 
legal norms and creating new avenues for coordinated legal activism.  
Finally, this study forges a link between interbranch studies of 
law and courts and legal mobilization scholarship. Both of these areas 
share much common ground despite largely operating in two separate 
scholarly spheres. An increasing number of law and courts scholars 
have challenged the tendency of legal studies to have an excessively 
narrow focus on the formal decisions of courts, especially the U.S. 
Supreme Court, without contextualizing these decisions in the broader 
landscape of institutional activity. Barnes, for example, highlights the 
importance of "microinstitutional analysis" that seeks to understand 
how continuously unfolding legal processes operate simultaneously 
across multiple political institutions (2007:33). This interbranch 
approach helps illustrate how major changes in law and public policy 
result from subtle institutional interactions over time. Given that law 
and society scholarship has long recognized that law's importance 
stretches well beyond decisions of the Supreme Court, the interbranch 
perspective and law and society scholarship have much in common. 
The emergence of law enforcement as a form of legal mobilization 
offers much of interest to scholars in both camps, and responds to 
calls for more linkages between scholarship studying complex 
organizations and studies focusing on social movements (Davis et al. 
2005).  
 
Law Enforcement as Legal Mobilization  
 
Scholars have generally examined legal mobilization by adopting 
either an instrumental perspective emphasizing how law directly 
influences society "by imposing external sanctions and inducements" 
or a constitutive perspective that draws attention to the role of law in 
"shaping internal meanings and creating new statuses" (Mather 
1998:900; Sarat & Kearns 1993; McCann 1994; McCann 2008). These 
perspectives need not be mutually exclusive, however. Particularly 
since the late 1990s, government prosecutors have employed criminal 
and civil lawsuits as a way to not simply "enforce the law" but to 
change it in ways that straddle the line between these instrumental 
and constitutive perspectives.  
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The best known example of this dynamic occurred in the late 
1990s, when state attorneys general (AGs) across the nation led a 
litigation campaign against tobacco companies. This litigation resulted 
in a $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), which to date 
remains the largest civil settlement in American history. The MSA, 
which followed the failure of comprehensive tobacco regulation in 
Congress, established a host of new tobacco advertising regulations, 
industry lobbying restrictions, and new de facto taxes on cigarettes 
(Derthick 2001). Mather's study of this litigation revealed the ways in 
which it had both direct and indirect effects by serving as a method of 
agenda setting and issue framing (Mather 1998). McCann, Haltom, and 
Fisher likewise examine the instrumental and constitutive dimensions 
of tobacco litigation in their study of how tobacco firms were 
"criminalized" over time, though with the suggestion that the process 
they trace may be limited to the peculiar politics of tobacco (2013:30).  
Since the tobacco litigation, however, government attorneys 
have used lawsuits and legal settlements across a wide range of 
industries – including the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry – 
with the goal of fundamentally changing the way that these corporate 
organizations operate. Much like the tobacco litigation, this activity has 
involved one part of the state (government prosecutors) attempting to 
employ the law in order to change the policy status quo supported by 
another part of the state (particularly the policy choices of Congress). I 
suggest that they have done so in three main ways.  
First, prosecutors' pharmaceutical litigation had the direct effect 
of forcing organizational change by using out-of-court settlements as a 
mechanism for imposing external sanctions on corporate 
organizations. This approach is consistent with the longstanding 
recognition of the importance of "bargaining in the shadow of the law" 
(Mnookin & Kornhauser 1979). The prospect of avoiding the 
substantial costs of active litigation explains why disputants often 
bargain in the shadow of the law rather than relying upon official legal 
actors to make decisions binding on both parties (McCann 2006:514). 
Recent government litigation illustrates this process at work. 
Prosecutors have used threats of additional litigation costs and bad 
publicity to persuade companies to enter settlements that 
fundamentally alter their corporate obligations. Additionally, these 
settlements have served as a way to "legalize accountability" in 
targeted industries. Epp explains how activists mobilized the law to 
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force local government bureaucracies to adopt new written rules, 
employee training programs, and new structures of managerial 
oversight in order to foster greater institutional compliance with 
emerging legal norms (2009). Government-led settlements between 
government litigators and corporations have included similar 
mechanisms, with the aim of reforming the internal operations of 
corporate defendants as a means to ensure compliance with the 
prosecutors' newly created legal requirements.  
Second, prosecutors' legal mobilization campaigns have served 
as a vehicle to expand the scope of the conflict over corporate 
activities by attracting other parties to the conflict over pharmaceutical 
prices. E.E. Schattschneider suggested that the "central political fact in 
a free society is the tremendous contagiousness of conflict" (1960:2). 
How a particular conflict is resolved, he argued, will depend largely on 
the breadth of its scope. Political disputes that draw in additional 
participants and adequately "socialize" conflict are more likely to have 
an impact on the existing political status quo (ibid: 7). Expanding the 
scope of the conflict is particularly important for those on the losing 
side of a conflict; "it is the loser who calls in outside help" (ibid:16). 
Several government litigation campaigns have sought to alter the 
political status quo after failed attempts to achieve these goals in 
other, more typical, policy-making venues. After initiating a law-based 
alternative method of policy change, prosecutors sought to expand the 
scope of the conflict by allying with several other actors. This has 
included other actors within the state, particularly bureaucratic 
agencies, as well as external actors such as advocacy groups and 
class-action attorneys.  
Third, this government-led litigation has had the constitutive 
effect of establishing new legal norms transforming existing 
understandings of key concepts such as "fraud." Scholars of social 
movements have noted the importance of "discursive opportunity 
structures" to the success of efforts for political change. For particular 
claims to gain public visibility, resonate with policymakers, and gain 
legitimacy, groups must frame their claims in a way that connects with 
widely accepted beliefs in society (Ferree, et al. 2002). Effective 
framing choices designed to challenge the status quo "must take into 
account and be shaped by the specific features of the complicated 
landscape on which they compete" (ibid.: 71). Claims that do not link 
with available discursive opportunities may face significant constraints 
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as compared to those framed in more "acceptable" ways. In several of 
their litigation campaigns, prosecutors have framed the underlying 
changes to the status quo as necessary to prevent "fraud" and "law-
breaking," thus adopting frames that made success more likely than 
previous efforts to achieve reform. These characterizations resonated 
across the political spectrum and helped shift the conflict away from 
polarized debates operating under frames less amenable to altering 
the status quo.  
The rise of government law enforcement to force organizational 
change, expand the scope of conflict, and establish new legal norms 
has occurred parallel to two broader developments in contemporary 
American politics: increasing congressional gridlock and the attack on 
private litigation. Divided government and increased political 
polarization have made traditional policy making more difficult, leading 
policy advocates to resort to "unorthodox lawmaking" (Sinclair 2011). 
Though Sinclair uses this phrase to discuss the development of new 
legislative procedures, the notion of unorthodox lawmaking also 
captures the turn to alternative methods of policy change, including 
the courts and legal mobilization. At the same time that policy 
advocates have turned to these other ways to achieve policymaking, 
however, the role of private litigation in American society has become 
more controversial. Concerns about an alleged "litigation explosion" in 
America prompted Congress and the federal courts to curtail 
opportunities for private litigators to bring lawsuits against 
corporations (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005; Wal-Mart v. Dukes; 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion).  
As achieving policy change through typical policy-making 
institutions has become more difficult and private litigators have faced 
more roadblocks in their efforts to employ the law, government 
prosecutors have become a focal point for efforts to mobilize the law 
to alter the political status quo. I now turn to one of the most 
prominent of these efforts: reform of pharmaceutical industry practices 
through law enforcement.1  
 
The Politics of Pharmaceuticals  
 
The effort by government prosecutors to mobilize the law as an 
instrument of pharmaceutical industry reform has received surprisingly 
little attention among scholars of law and politics despite the salience 
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and contentiousness of health care policy in contemporary American 
politics. In 2010, total health care spending represented about 18 
percent of the United States' entire gross domestic product, up from 
13.8 percent as recently as 2000 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012). 
Expenditures on prescription drugs, which reached $307 billion 
nationally in 2010 (Gatyas 2011), have been a significant part of this 
overall spending. Americans have faced some of the highest 
prescription drug prices in the world for years, with pharmaceutical 
costs rising much faster than general health care inflation (Danzon and 
Furukawa 2008).  
Throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, lawmakers and 
activists began focusing on allegedly unscrupulous drug industry 
practices as a driver of high pharmaceutical costs. For example, 
Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), one of the industry's biggest 
critics, argued early in the 1990s that "unless the industry can provide 
an adequate explanation for these price hikes, one can only conclude 
that what is going on is greed on a massive scale" (Rovner 1992). 
Groups such as the AARP emphasized the impact of pharmaceutical 
company practices on the pocketbooks of the poor and elderly (Pear 
2002). Other advocacy organizations argued that rapidly rising health 
care costs violated basic tenets of justice and fairness. Community 
Catalyst, founded in 1997 as the "voice for consumers in health care 
reform," cited rising drug costs as a major obstacle to its goal of 
guaranteed access to high quality, affordable health care for all 
(Community Catalyst).  
For years, advocacy groups and their legislative allies sought to 
combat alleged drug company "greed" through legislation aimed at 
controlling prescription drug prices. Several proposals sought to 
eliminate tax subsidies for drug companies and provide a combination 
of carrots and sticks to ensure that increases in drug prices remained 
in line with overall inflation (Medication Price Control Act of 1991; 
Prescription Drug Cost Containment Act of 1992). These efforts 
appeared to receive a major boost with the election of President Bill 
Clinton, who in 1993 announced a plan that would expand drug 
coverage provided under government health care programs while also 
attempting to control pharmaceutical inflation. Among other ideas, 
Clinton proposed a new National Health Board tasked with 
investigating "unreasonable" drug prices. Borrowing a popular idea 
from industry critics, Clinton also proposed allowing the Secretary of 
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Health and Human Services (HHS) to negotiate with pharmaceutical 
companies over drug prices paid for by the government (Freudenheim 
1993).  
Despite a two-year window in which Democrats enjoyed unified 
control of Congress and the presidency, however, these legislative 
attempts to expand government regulation over the pharmaceutical 
industry failed. Representatives from drug companies denounced 
Clinton's pharmaceutical proposals as an attempt to achieve price 
controls on prescription drugs that would "slow down or eliminate the 
volume of research" on new drug innovation (ibid). When the 1994 
elections gave Republicans control of both houses of Congress, the 
prospects for pharmaceutical pricing reform looked bleak. Clinton's 
push for reform had failed even with a Democratic Congress, and it 
was unlikely that the new conservative majority would pursue strict 
government regulation of drug companies. Advocates for lower drug 
prices continued pursuing other ways to control drug costs, such as 
allowing the re-importation of prescription drugs from Canada, where 
pharmaceutical prices are lower because of direct government price 
controls (Prescription Drug Parity Act of 1999). The efforts, like those 
before them, foundered on concerns that government intervention 
would damage private sector innovation.  
 
Efforts to Reform the "Average Wholesale Price" 
System  
 
Amidst these failed legislative efforts, an alternative route to 
reform pharmaceutical industry practices involved changing how 
government health care programs pay for prescription drug coverage. 
At the center of these efforts were attempted reforms of a drug pricing 
system known as "Average Wholesale Price" (AWP). Since shortly after 
the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, AWP has served as the 
pricing benchmark the government uses to pay for drugs covered by 
these programs. Pharmaceutical companies do not receive government 
reimbursements directly under Medicare and Medicaid, but instead 
make money by selling pharmaceuticals to health care providers. 
These providers include pharmacies that dispense drugs to patients, as 
well as doctors and hospitals that purchase physician-administered 
drugs directly from pharmaceutical companies for use at doctors' 
offices or in the hospital outpatient setting. The government then 
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reimburses the providers according to the AWP for each prescribed 
drug.  
In theory, the AWP is supposed to reflect the average price 
providers pay drug companies for prescription drugs. The AWP, 
however, has no statutory definition. Governments receive AWP 
information for drugs from private commercial publishers of drug 
pricing data, the most prominent being First DataBank. These 
commercial publishers in turn receive the AWP pricing information 
directly from manufacturers themselves (Gencarelli 2002:3). Figure 1 
illustrates the crucial role of AWP in government reimbursements for 
prescription drug coverage.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The problem is that the AWP, despite its name, is not an 
"average" price at all. Drug companies have discretion to set the AWPs 
for their products themselves. The AWPs are often considerably higher 
than the actual amount providers pay for drugs because the AWPs do 
not reflect the many discounts drug companies offer providers as an 
incentive to purchase their products. In this respect, the AWP is similar 
to the "sticker price" for vehicles in the automobile industry. The 
difference between this AWP sticker price and the actual price 
providers pay for the drugs is known as the "spread." Because the 
government reimburses providers based on the AWPs – and not the 
actual amount drug companies charge providers for the drugs – 
providers can make extra money by prescribing drugs with high 
spreads. For example, a manufacturer might sell a physician-
administered drug to a doctor for 30 cents a dose, but set the AWP at 
$1 a dose. The government would then reimburse the doctor $1 a 
dose despite the doctor's actual cost being only 30 cents. The 
physician thus pockets a profit of 70 cents for each dose (Pear 2001). 
Drug companies, in turn, have the incentive to inflate their reported 
AWPs so they can offer health care providers spreads higher than 
those available for competing products.  
The government has long been aware that these incentives 
could drive up drug costs. As early as 1968, officials had noted that 
increasing the spread between actual drug costs and the reported AWP 
could be a way for drug companies to "maneuver against competing 
products." As concerns about rising health care costs rose in the 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Law & Social Inquiry, Vol 40, No. 1 (Winter 2015): pg. 123-151. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
11 
 
1990s, President Clinton noted the problems with the flawed, but legal, 
AWP system. In a 1997 address calling for additional efforts to reduce 
health care costs, Clinton described the AWP system as an example of 
types of "waste and abuse" that "aren't even illegal [because] they're 
just embedded in the practices of the system" (Spears & Pullman 
2002:73). For years, the difference between AWP and the actual 
market prices for drugs led pharmaceutical industry observers to refer 
to AWP as "Ain't What's Paid" (Kalb, Bass, and Fabrikant 2001).  
This issue was important to many other groups beyond 
government officials. While AWP served as the main pricing benchmark 
for government reimbursements, it also was the price private insurers 
and health care plans used to determine reimbursements for 
prescription drugs. This included Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance 
associations, union health care plans, and self-insured employers 
across the country (Gencarelli 2002:3). These groups, like the 
government, had paid billions of dollars in prescription drug 
reimbursements based upon AWP.  
Despite the many concerns raised about AWP, Congress 
continued the use of this manufacturer-reported benchmark. This was 
largely because of lobbying efforts by physicians who argued that it 
would be impossible for them to stay in business and serve Medicare 
and Medicaid recipients without benefiting from the spread created by 
the AWP (Carter 2002:44). According to these health care providers, 
the spread helped to make up for losses due to inadequate 
government payments for other services they provided under Medicare 
and Medicaid. Further, the pharmacy industry claimed that the spread 
enabled pharmacies to cover their costs in states where the state-
provided dispensing fees for Medicaid-covered prescriptions were 
inadequate to cover the pharmacies' actual dispensing costs 
(Gencarelli 2002:7).  
Despite the convoluted nature of the AWP system, these 
arguments convinced Congress to maintain AWP as the pricing 
benchmark in government health care programs even in the face of 
the Clinton Administration's significant push to change the system. In 
his 1998 budget proposal, Clinton proposed eliminating AWP and 
replacing it with a formula directly related to actual costs paid by 
providers. Congress rejected this proposal, instead making much less 
drastic changes to the drug reimbursement formula in the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997. The Administration subsequently fought for larger 
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tweaks to the AWP payment system in both 1999 and 2000, but 
neither of these proposals gained traction in Congress.  
 
From Legislative Efforts to Legal Mobilization  
 
Amidst these numerous failed legislative attempts to control 
prescription drug costs, the locus of activity shifted from Congress to 
the courtroom. The shift was similar to what was occurring in the 
context of tobacco policy, where failures to achieve industry regulation 
in Congress spurred the nation's AGs to work together on what would 
become the Master Settlement Agreement. At the same time that 
President Clinton was highlighting the potential of AWP in driving 
higher drugs costs, federal and state prosecutors began collecting 
information from leading pharmaceutical firms concerning their 
prescription drug pricing strategies (Alpert 1997). This investigation 
gradually blossomed into a full-scale litigation campaign in which 
prosecutors, as with the tobacco litigation, made no secret that they 
were attempting to alter practices in the pharmaceutical industry on a 
national scale. As one member of the Florida AG's office put it, "the 
goal is nothing less than changing the way the industry does business" 
(Guiden 2001).  
 
Forcing Organizational Change within Big Pharma  
 
During their initial investigations, state and federal prosecutors 
began characterizing as "fraudulent" the way in which drug companies 
marketed the spread between AWP and actual costs to provide 
incentives to providers for prescribing their products. Soon after, they 
sought a settlement with a major drug manufacturer in the hope that 
it would set a precedent for other companies to move away from the 
use of AWP (Cloud & McGinley 2000). Central to the government 
strategy was an innovative interpretation of the False Claims Act 
("FCA"), a Civil War-era statute that originally aimed to crack down on 
"rampant fraud" among defense contractors doing business with the 
Union army (Krause 2004:65). According to the prosecutors, 
marketing the spread represented illegal fraud under the FCA. 
The suggestion that the AWP system, which even President 
Clinton had acknowledged was legal, was actually fraudulent came as 
a surprise to the pharmaceutical industry. Industry members observed 
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that the government had known for years that marketing the spread 
was an accepted industry practice and yet explicitly kept AWP as part 
of the government reimbursement system. Nevertheless, the prospect 
of FCA liability was particularly disturbing for pharmaceutical firms, 
since every filled Medicare or Medicaid prescription could be a "false 
claim" subject to treble damages and the maximum penalty under the 
statute. These penalties could quickly add up to create potential 
exposure to these firms running into hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Additionally, if a company was found guilty of any criminal violations 
involved in a potential suit, the company could be excluded from 
Medicare and other federal health care programs. Given the share of 
the overall pharmaceutical market that government programs 
represent, this penalty is akin to a corporate "death sentence" 
(Zalesky 2006). Under these conditions, drug companies realized that 
litigating government claims all the way to a jury verdict would be 
risky and potentially fatal.  
The FCA cast a long shadow over the bargaining between 
prosecutors and leading members of the industry. In January 2001, 
the negotiating leverage prosecutors derived from the FCA paid off. 
Since May of the previous year, prosecutors had been in talks with 
Bayer Pharmaceuticals to resolve allegations that Bayer fraudulently 
marketed the spread of its hemophilia and AIDS drugs. Under pressure 
from threatened litigation and unwilling to risk a corporate "death 
sentence" if found liable under the FCA, Bayer settled the 
governments' allegations. In addition to requiring Bayer to pay $14 
million, the settlement required the company to report a new pricing 
benchmark that prosecutors hoped would become an alternative to 
AWP. This new pricing benchmark, called the "Average Sales Price" 
(ASP), sought to reflect actual prices providers paid for prescription 
drugs including all discounts, rebates, and other benefits tied to the 
purchase of the drug (Bayer Corporate Integrity Agreement 2001:11-
15). Because the ASP, unlike the AWP, was a defined term and set by 
actual market prices rather than by the manufacturer, this was 
intended to reduce price "manipulation" by the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
In addition to establishing a new pricing system that 
prosecutors hoped would serve as an alternative to AWP, the Bayer 
settlement was also crucial for the way it attempted to legalize 
accountability throughout the organization. The settlement required 
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the company to appoint an internal compliance officer and create a 
compliance committee tasked with monitoring Bayer's day-to-day 
adherence to the settlement's regulatory terms. The committee was 
required to create new written codes of conduct detailing the internal 
procedures Bayer would take to comply with the agreement (Bayer 
Corporate Integrity Agreement 2001:4). In addition, the settlement 
required specific training and educational programs for employees to 
ensure compliance. While the settlement placed responsibility of 
implementing these provisions on the company, all of the company's 
actions were subject to enhanced oversight by the federal government 
(ibid: 29).  
The government prosecutors viewed the Bayer settlement as a 
watershed agreement that could prompt the replacement of the 
existing AWP system with the "more accurate" ASP system. New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer characterized the settlement as "a 
significant victory...[that] sends a strong message to other 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and health care providers that we will 
not allow them to enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers and 
those most in need" (Pear 2001). This "strong message" resonated 
across the industry, as Bayer became the first domino to fall in the 
government prosecutors' strategy to attack the AWP reimbursement 
system.  
Following the Bayer settlement was an even more significant 
agreement later in 2001, which involved TAP Pharmaceuticals and its 
cancer drug, Lupron. As with the Bayer case, government prosecutors 
claimed that TAP's marketing the spread represented illegal fraud 
under the FCA. TAP disputed these allegations, but the threat of a 
corporate "death sentence" helped federal and state prosecutors to 
achieve a $875 million settlement with TAP, the largest health care 
fraud settlement in history to that time (Department of Justice 2001). 
Much like the Bayer settlement, the TAP agreement sought to legalize 
accountability by forcing the creation of internal oversight provisions. 
It also required TAP to enter into an agreement with HHS requiring 
government oversight of the company's marketing and sales practices 
for seven years, the first settlement to require this sort of scrutiny. 
Perhaps most importantly, the settlement required TAP to report the 
ASP for each of its drugs on a quarterly basis, similar to the provision 
the prosecutors had won in the Bayer settlement. The settlement 
permitted the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), an 
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agency within HHS, to rely upon this ASP data in setting 
reimbursement rates for TAP's products under Medicare. It also 
allowed state Medicaid programs to use ASPs to set their own 
reimbursements rates (TAP Corporate Integrity Agreement 2001:10-
11).  
The prosecutors' bargaining in the shadow of the law proved to 
be a powerful method of policy-making for two important reasons. 
First, unlike policies created through typical policy making or 
regulatory processes, the new corporate responsibilities couched in 
these agreements were largely immune from judicial review. This was 
a particularly important benefit given the uncertain legal ground upon 
which the threatened Bayer and TAP lawsuits rested. The contention 
that AWP was "fraudulent" faced a number of legal problems, including 
the fact that health care providers, and not pharmaceutical firms, were 
the direct beneficiaries of the AWP spread. The government had also 
long known that AWP really meant "Ain't What's Paid" – and even 
explicitly maintained AWP as a way to ensure that physicians and 
other providers were adequately compensated by the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. However, by lodging their regulation of the 
pharmaceutical industry in out-of-court settlements, prosecutors 
simultaneously leveraged judicial power to force new regulations while 
insulating these regulations from judicial review.  
Second, these settlements were largely self-implementing since 
they did not rely upon third parties – courts and judges – to enforce 
organizational change. Because new corporate responsibilities were 
lodged in an "agreement," it was easier to obtain immediate buy-in on 
the part of the regulated industry. Enforcement then proceeded along 
two tracks: legalized accountability through instituting internal 
mechanisms of compliance along with increased oversight by the 
government parties to the agreement. These enforcement mechanisms 
helped sidestep the oft-cited problem that courts lack enforcement 
capabilities necessary to effectuate widespread change because they 
have neither the power of sword nor the purse (Rosenberg 1991, 
2008).  
 
Expanding the Scope of AWP Litigation  
 
Critical to the government litigators' efforts to change 
organizational culture and policy on a national scale was their ability to 
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draw in additional participants to the conflict over pharmaceutical 
prices. Prosecutors stood at the center of an emerging fight about drug 
industry practices, providing an arena for the socialization of conflict 
pertaining to a once obscure issue seemingly of interest mainly to 
health care providers. This role was particularly important given that 
advocates for industry reform were losing in traditional policy-making 
venues. Coming on the heels of failed legislative attempts to reform 
drug pricing practices, the watershed Bayer and TAP settlements 
served as a major "wake up call" to the industry (Pharmaceutical Law 
& Industry Report 2001) and as a prototype for a subsequent wave of 
lawsuits by state-level public prosecutors as well as private class-
action litigators.  
 
The Expansion of State Litigation  
 
Following the Bayer and TAP settlements, AGs from across the 
nation pursued their own state-level AWP claims against drug 
companies. Texas AG John Cornyn filed the first individual state AWP 
lawsuit in the fall of 2000, alleging that three pharmaceutical firms had 
inflated the AWP for asthma inhalants and marketed the spread to 
pharmacists (Appleby 2000). Several other AGs soon followed with 
increasingly expansive claims of their own. For example, Nevada AG 
Frankie Sue Del Papa's lawsuit in early 2002 not only named a dozen 
defendants but also contained a variety of Medicaid fraud, antitrust, 
and consumer protection claims (Elfin 2002). Del Papa's complaint also 
repeatedly referred to the pharmaceutical companies' behavior as part 
of a "racketeering enterprise" and an "AWP Scheme," an attempt to 
coin negative labels for pricing behavior that had for decades been 
part of the government's reimbursement system. Del Papa noted that 
the breadth of her complaint, which also sought a redefinition of AWP, 
"has nationwide applications because of its similarities to the historic 
tobacco litigation in which the states eventually recovered billions of 
dollars" (ibid).  
The quantity of litigation expanded from these early state 
efforts, both in terms of the number of states involved in bringing 
lawsuits as well as the number of defendants targeted by the lawsuits. 
Table 1 indicates the progression of these state lawsuits over time.2  
 
[Table 1 about here]  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Law & Social Inquiry, Vol 40, No. 1 (Winter 2015): pg. 123-151. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
17 
 
State prosecutors collaborated closely on these cases. The key 
organizational mechanism was the Pharmaceutical Task Force 
established in 2002 under the auspices of the National Association of 
Attorneys General. The goal of this Task Force was to encourage 
communication and collaboration among the states, federal 
enforcement agencies, and the private bar. In addition to serving as 
an information clearinghouse for AGs bringing their own lawsuits, the 
Task Force served as an umbrella under which several multistate 
lawsuits against the pharmaceutical industry proceeded (Cutler 2003).  
 
Collaborations with Federal Agencies, Private Litigators, and 
Advocacy Groups  
 
Throughout the expanding AWP litigation campaign, state and 
federal prosecutors worked closely with other institutional insiders 
within the federal government, particularly attorneys in the Office of 
the Inspector General within HHS. Because HHS helps to administer 
government health care programs through its Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency served as a crucial partner 
for government prosecutors. In particular, prosecutors' legal 
settlements pertaining to AWP typically require the settling company 
to enter Corporate Integrity Agreements with HHS, which allow the 
agency to monitor the company's compliance with its new corporate 
responsibilities and grant it the authority to exclude non-compliant 
companies from government health care programs.  
While prosecutors benefited from the assistance provided by 
institutional insiders within HHS to help enforce the new legal 
requirements they sought, the agency also benefited from these 
collaborations by gaining additional powers resulting from the 
prosecutors' settlements – powers that often went beyond the explicit 
authority established by Congress. For example, the TAP settlement 
not only granted the agency additional powers to oversee TAP's 
corporate operations, but it allowed CMS to rely upon the settlement-
generated ASP data in setting reimbursement rates for TAP's products 
under Medicare and Medicaid. This was despite Congress's previous 
enactment of the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement 
and Protection Act of 2000, which, among other things, precluded the 
agency from "directly or indirectly decreas[ing] the rates or 
reimbursement...under the current reimbursement methodology." This 
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dynamic, in which government agencies assist prosecutors' 
mobilization of the law as a way to empower themselves, bears 
similarities to other ways in which agencies have supported the growth 
of the "litigation state" as a way to bolster bureaucratic capacity 
(Farhang 2010). 
In addition to allying with institutional insiders, prosecutors also 
collaborated closely with outside groups. Among the most important 
collaborations were those between state-level public prosecutors and 
private plaintiffs' lawyers. As AWP litigation spread across the country, 
AGs hired private attorneys on a contingency fee basis to handle many 
of the states' tactical litigation decisions, including drafting legal briefs 
and crafting settlement provisions. Owing to the complexity of the 
AWP litigation, states drew from a common pool of private class action 
lawyers with particular expertise in pharmaceutical law. One plaintiffs' 
firm in particular, Hagens Berman, handled much of the day-to-day 
litigation for several of the states joining the campaign against drug 
companies.3 This coordination with a small pool of plaintiffs' lawyers 
had the effect of both harmonizing the "AWP-as-fraud" narrative and 
providing private attorneys with additional resources they could later 
use in private class-action litigation.  
The initial federal and state prosecutions also served as a model 
for separate private class action lawsuits brought by advocacy groups 
with similar goals in mind. Pharmaceutical industry critics had long 
been active in the fight against high drug costs, but had focused their 
activism in legislative and regulatory avenues until the landmark Bayer 
and TAP settlements. These settlements opened up litigation as a 
promising new avenue for advocacy groups seeking reform of 
pharmaceutical pricing. In April 2001, a few months after the Bayer 
settlement, a coalition of various unions, non-profit health care 
organizations, and progressive advocacy groups formed the 
Prescription Access Litigation project (PAL). The coalition aimed to 
coordinate litigation with the purpose of "working to end illegal 
pharmaceutical industry practices and fighting for more affordable 
drug prices" (Prescription Access Litigation). Operating as a project of 
Community Catalyst, a national advocacy organization for consumer 
rights in the healthcare system, PAL was not hesitant to explain the 
policy-oriented purpose of their lawsuits:  
 
The longer-term goal [of PAL's class action lawsuits] is to put a 
halt to drug company practices that keep the cost of drugs high. 
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The lawsuits will move the issue of access to prescription drugs 
to the forefront of the public eye. Historically, class action 
lawsuits have been a vehicle to encourage legislative leaders to 
take action on a particular policy issue. It is our hope that the 
actions of the PAL initiative will persuade state and 
Congressional legislative leaders to address the high price of 
prescription drugs and the problems many people experience in 
obtaining needed medications (Prescription Access Litigation).  
 
In December 2001, two months after the announcement of the 
prosecutors' TAP settlement, the PAL coalition filed a major class-
action lawsuit in Massachusetts against 28 drug companies. Most of 
the defendants in this lawsuit were already under investigation by 
federal and state prosecutors, which the class action complaint was 
quick to note. For each of the defendants, which included both TAP 
and Bayer, the complaint prominently stated that these companies had 
"been the target of government investigations" and included 
information drawn from these investigations as part of the narrative of 
criminal complicity that the complaint was attempting to build 
(Complaint, In Re Pharmaceutical Industry:39). The complaint also 
contained language similar to that in the prosecutors' earlier 
complaints, including characterizations of AWP as an "industry-wide 
scheme" to defraud those paying for prescription drugs (Complaint, In 
Re Pharmaceutical Industry: 1). The similarity of legal language was 
aided by the fact that many of the same private class-action firms that 
had been retained by AGs were also hired by members of the PAL 
coalition, which further coordinated tactics among the different 
elements of the anti-AWP coalition.4  
In addition to targeting the same industry defendants as the 
government prosecutors, the goals of the litigation were very similar. 
Much as the prosecutors sought "nothing less than changing the way 
the industry does business" (Guiden 2001), the activist groups sought 
to use class-action litigation to force a "system change" in how the 
pharmaceutical industry sold their products (Gold and Caffrey 2002). 
Given this shared focus on similar public policy goals, it is not 
surprising that the lawsuits filed by the PAL coalition built directly upon 
the "AWP-as-fraud" frame developed by the government prosecutions. 
The similarities between the lawsuits brought by prosecutors and 
members of the PAL coalition resulted in several of the AGs' lawsuits 
being consolidated with PAL's in federal court (In Re Pharmaceutical 
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Industry). AWP litigation continues to this day, and public and private 
plaintiffs have reached dozens of settlements with pharmaceutical 
company defendants.  
 
The Power of Prosecutors as a Coalition Leader  
 
As initiators of the AWP litigation, prosecutors led a broader 
coalition of cause lawyers that now includes agency lawyers, advocacy 
groups, and the private bar. As Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold 
have described them, cause lawyers share a commitment to "altering 
some aspect of the social, economic, and political status quo" 
(1998:4). Despite this broad formulation, studies of cause lawyering 
have shared an emphasis on "bottom-up" studies of legal mobilization 
by focusing on the actions of "outsider" lawyers, reflecting the view 
that "cause lawyering is everywhere a deviant strain within the legal 
profession" (Sarat & Scheingold 1998:3). The NAACP's campaign 
against segregated education remains the classic example of cause 
lawyering, though studies have also examined cause lawyering for the 
poor, gays and lesbians, consumers, and evangelicals (Sarat & 
Scheingold 2006). These studies situate cause lawyers as actors 
outside and opposed to the state who use legal processes to force 
changes to the political status quo. Law-based reform groups such as 
PAL, as an explicitly political "outsider" consumer advocacy group, 
appear to fit the typical model of cause lawyers well.  
Government prosecutors are in some ways the consummate 
"insiders," since their typical role is to use the law to carry out the 
interests of the state. Nevertheless, the litigation campaigns described 
in this article suggest that prosecutors occupy a more complicated 
position in the legal community. Through innovative interpretations of 
ambiguous civil and criminal law, prosecutors have employed their 
legal resources as leverage to achieve political changes that other 
parts of the state have declined to make. In this way, they act as 
"insiders" within the state that are nevertheless positioned against the 
state. Despite their insider status, they seek very similar goals as the 
advocacy group allies with whom they frequently collaborate. Beyond 
providing "elite support" for these outsider groups, government 
prosecutors have taken a leadership role in litigation campaigns such 
as that against the pharmaceutical industry.  
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The characterization of government prosecutors as akin to 
"cause lawyers" is not to suggest that widespread change of the 
political status quo was their only motivation. After all, pharmaceutical 
industry settlements generated a great deal of money for the 
government, and many of the prosecutors involved, at least at the 
state level, were elected officials for whom electoral considerations 
undoubtedly loomed large. With that caveat in mind, however, the 
similarity between the explicit political reform goals of government 
prosecutors and outside activists is difficult to dismiss. While these 
goals likely mixed with other more self-interested motives, such 
motivational complexity is likely true of most cause lawyering.5 
Although private class action litigators often argue that their litigation 
seeks justice for clients who would otherwise be without a voice, 
monetary considerations also influence whether these actors bring 
litigation. Likewise, the existence of various motivations for 
government attorneys to engage in legal mobilization ought not to 
obscure that a commitment to "altering some aspect of the social, 
economic, and political status quo" was a central concern for these 
prosecutors – a motivation recognized by the advocates who partnered 
with prosecutors to mobilize the law for political change.  
Indeed, the government lawyers' position as advocates for the 
"public interest" offered them unique advantages as cause lawyers 
that helped them serve as a vanguard for a broader movement. For 
one, by suggesting that they were merely "enforcing the law" against 
rogue drug companies, government attorneys created what Eugene 
Lewis termed an "apolitical shield" around activities that are actually 
very much political (Lewis 1980:17-18). The apolitical shield possessed 
by law enforcers made it more difficult for pharmaceutical industry 
defendants to claim that the legal attack they faced was motivated by 
a group with an ideological axe to grind. 
Prosecutors also brought significant institutional resources to 
this litigation. In Galanter's oft-cited terminology (1974), prosecutors 
are repeat players with advantages over private one-shotters who 
attempt to use litigation as an instrument of reform. Most importantly, 
prosecutors offer important elements of "standing" in two senses of 
the word. First, their position as advocates for the "public interest" 
provide them legal standing unavailable to private litigators, allowing 
them to access court by connecting allegations of pharmaceutical 
"fraud" to direct harm to their ostensible client, the American 
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taxpayer. Second, they have standing in the sense of "having a voice 
in the media" (Ferree, et al. 2002, 86). As respected law enforcement 
personnel, prosecutors are better positioned to gain the attention and 
sympathies of the mass media. In an American society undergoing a 
broader turn to "governing through crime" (Simon 2008; McCann, 
Haltom & Fisher 2013) and in which "popular entertainment celebrates 
such enforcers of criminal law" (McCann, Haltom & Fisher 2013:12) 
government prosecutors are in a strong position to gain media 
standing unavailable to private litigators and thus exert meaningful 
pressure through their legal mobilization campaigns.  
 
Establishing New Legal Norms: The Broader Framing 
Effects of Litigation  
 
At the start of the prosecutors' AWP litigation campaign, 
legislative efforts to control the price of drugs faced significant 
constraints in part because they operated under frames that were 
unfavorable given the political context. Particularly after Republicans 
won control of Congress in the 1994 elections, the conservative 
congressional majority was unlikely to be moved by calls to "combat 
corporate greed" through price controls the industry viewed as an 
unwarranted intervention into the free market. Further, health care 
providers gave lawmakers a compelling frame of the AWP system as a 
necessary way to compensate them for losses they incurred providing 
other services under Medicare and Medicaid. These existing frames, 
bolstered by decades of AWP's persistence, appeared to provide a 
strong rationale for AWP's continued existence in the 1990s.  
As law enforcement actors, prosecutors used their position to 
shift the frame surrounding these longstanding drug pricing practices. 
Throughout the litigation was an attempt to replace the positive frame 
of AWP as a necessary part of the Medicare and Medicaid system with 
a negative frame of AWP as "fraud" by lawbreaking pharmaceutical 
companies. It was no coincidence that prosecutors' legal complaints 
characterized the existing payment system as an "AWP Scheme" and 
part of a "racketeering enterprise." Prosecutors also employed the 
media to advance these negative frames following settlements by 
issuing coordinated press releases containing frames of corporate 
malfeasance.6 This strategy shares much in common with activists' 
efforts to criminalize Big Tobacco beginning in the 1990s (McCann, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Law & Social Inquiry, Vol 40, No. 1 (Winter 2015): pg. 123-151. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
23 
 
Haltom & Fisher 2013). As with the tobacco litigation, litigation against 
pharmaceutical companies followed a "crimtort" model involving a 
hybrid of civil and criminal legal claims that was part of a broader 
effort to criminalize previously accepted corporate behavior (Koenig & 
Rustad 1998; McCann, Haltom & Fisher 2013).  
A significant aspect of this re-framing of AWP as "fraud" is that 
it appealed across the political spectrum, which was particularly 
important in an era in which conservative Republicans were ascendant 
in various policy-making arenas. Many liberal critics of "Big Pharma" 
had little problem viewing the AWP system as another example of 
corporate greed within the drug industry. Yet this re-framing also 
appealed to conservatives who seized upon the AWP system as 
another example of waste, fraud, and abuse in burgeoning federal 
social programs. Republicans praised legislative efforts to encourage 
state AWP lawsuits against drug companies, for example, as a way to 
help U.S. taxpayers "recover the billions of dollars stolen through fraud 
every year" (151 Cong. 31 Oct. 2005:12069). As Senator John McCain 
(R-AZ) put it, pharmaceutical pricing "fraud" was another example of 
"wasteful and unnecessary" government spending (151 Cong. 20 Dec. 
2005:14073). Helping advance this anti-government "waste" frame 
was the fact that the coalition of prosecutors litigating against drug 
companies included a bipartisan group of Republican and Democratic 
AGs as well as George W. Bush's Department of Justice.  
Prosecutors, at least those on the state level, were also able to 
draw upon their status as the legal representatives of their states in a 
way that provided them an advantageous position. Scholars have 
noted how the conservative shift in the courts beginning in the 1970s, 
which continued through the Supreme Court's "federalism revolution" 
in the 1990s, resulted in a judiciary more sympathetic to state-based 
legal claims. The courts' sympathies to "states' rights" helped state 
litigators find more success across a broad range of legal claims 
(Waltenburg & Swinford 1999). By characterizing drug pricing reform 
as a crucial issue for the states, the AGs' legal mobilization was 
compatible with frames held in a positive light by judicial actors, 
thereby providing more plausibility to threats of litigation.  
The prosecutors' framing contributed to shifts in the political 
landscape as Congress and the courts gradually accepted the new legal 
understanding of AWP advocated by government prosecutors. After 
years of refusing to change the AWP formula for drug reimbursements, 
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Congress began shifting its posture following the success of the Bayer 
and TAP settlements and the wave of state litigation that followed. 
Building upon the existing federal and state investigations, an 
increasing number of members of Congress decided to respond with 
their own investigations (Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report 2003: 
711). Indeed, key congressional committees sought and incorporated 
information from these lawsuits as part of their own investigations 
(Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report 2004b: 604). A few months 
after the Bayer settlement and in the midst of the TAP investigation 
and increasing state litigation, Congress held its first hearing to 
discuss problems with the AWP system. The very title of the hearing 
was revealing, as it characterized the AWP "a broken system for 
patients and taxpayers" despite only months earlier requiring the 
Medicare system to keep using the AWP benchmark and prohibiting 
any alternatives (107 Cong. 21 Sept. 2001). Following this first 
hearing in 2001, the number of congressional committees examining 
the issue proliferated.7 Congress invited prosecutors to testify about 
their lawsuits and explain how drug companies committed "fraud" in 
their state Medicaid programs (108 Cong. 7 Dec. 2004).  
Following the TAP settlement in 2001, one industry attorney 
remarked, "Three or four years ago, if you surveyed manufacturers 
and asked if AWPs were kickbacks, they'd have looked at you like you 
were from another planet" (Carter 2002:44). By 2003, the terms of 
the debate had changed to such an extent that Congress reversed its 
decades-long support for AWP and began seeking alternatives for the 
system. In December 2003, Congress addressed the issue of 
prescription drug reimbursements in the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA). The MMA moved to end 
AWP as the baseline for reimbursement rates in the newly created 
Medicare Part D program as well as for prescription drugs already 
provided under the program. In the place of AWP, now described as a 
"flawed" system, Congress adopted precisely the same pricing 
benchmark developed as part of the TAP and Bayer settlements – the 
"Average Sales Price." The MMA borrowed the definition of ASP directly 
from the settlements, defining it as an average of the actual final sales 
prices of the drugs including all rebates and other discounts. Congress 
also required companies participating in the Medicare program to 
report the ASPs for their drugs to CMS on a quarterly basis, similar to 
the provisions previously achieved in the Bayer and TAP settlements. 
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In essence, these congressional changes were acquiescing to the 
national changes in pharmaceutical pricing that government 
prosecutors were already achieving, settlement by settlement, through 
their litigation.  
 
Law Enforcement as Legal Mobilization beyond the AWP 
Context  
 
As public policy and organizational scholars have long noted, 
organizations learn from their experiences (March and Olsen 1979; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2002). Positive feedback reinforces future 
activity, creating public policy cascades in which "each change begets 
another even larger change" (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 139). 
Similarly, social movement scholars have noted how movement 
strategies often migrate from one setting to another as "the 
dissemination of ideas and models…cause actors to perceive new 
possibilities or imperatives for action" (Davis et al 2005:53; Minkoff 
1997). The success of the NAACP's civil rights litigation in Brown v. 
Board of Education, for example, provided a signal to other social 
movement groups that the judiciary was willing to consider their 
claims, leading these groups to emulate the NAACP's legal strategies 
(Meyer & Boutcher 2007). These notions of policy feedback effects and 
diffusion processes help to explain the development of mechanisms 
that might have been unusual and limited to one setting at one time 
but have since become commonplace across a variety of contexts.  
These dynamics capture what has become an emerging model 
of government litigation that began with the tobacco litigation and has 
spread to several other policy contexts. Linking these campaigns is the 
coordinated efforts to force organizational reform through global 
settlements, expand the scope of the conflict with various other 
groups, and establish new legal norms in an effort to fundamentally 
shape the practices of entire national industries. This differs from the 
typical role of government attorneys as defending the policy status 
quo from law-based attempts to change it by outsider movements or 
to "enforcing the law" against individual law-breakers in a reactive, ad 
hoc fashion.  
The lineage for this sort of legal mobilization traces to the 
previously mentioned tobacco litigation that settled just as the 
government's drug pricing investigations were beginning to unfold. 
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Like the pharmaceutical pricing settlements, the tobacco settlement 
was important not only because of the large amount of money 
involved, but also because it served to place various restrictions and 
requirements on the industry that anti-tobacco advocates had long 
sought from Congress. The successful resolution of the tobacco 
litigation illustrated a couple of crucial aspects that have helped lead to 
this emerging model of coordinated government-led legal mobilization. 
First, it illustrated the power of "law enforcement" in getting results 
that private litigation could not. Facing coordinated, high-profile 
investigations by law enforcers willing to label widespread industry 
practices as "fraudulent," companies would be willing to settle for 
massive fines and agree to new regulations. Second, this process 
introduced a powerful policy-making alternative to legislation. The MSA 
rose from the ashes of failed attempts to regulate the industry through 
congressional statute, mirroring many of the regulations that had 
never been more than proposals in Congress. In short, government-
led legal mobilization could be a powerful way of achieving policy 
changes even when efforts in other venues have failed. Below I 
provide three additional areas in which law enforcement as legal 
mobilization has been similarly prominent.  
 
Pharmaceutical Marketing  
 
For one, the ongoing drug pricing litigation campaign represents 
only a part of the broader government-led attack on pharmaceutical 
industry practices. One of the fastest growing areas of government 
litigation against the drug industry involves use of lawsuits and 
settlements to reshape drug marketing. Most importantly, prosecutors 
have used the False Claims Act and other federal and state statutes to 
limit the ability of drug firms to promote the "off label" use of their 
products. While federal law does not explicitly allow pharmaceutical 
firms to promote uses of their products beyond those approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Congress in the late 1990s 
enacted the Food and Drug Modernization Act making it legal for drug 
firms to provide doctors with "neutral information" about the off-label 
uses of their drugs, including peer-reviewed scientific studies. This 
controversial change was a blow to industry critics who argued that 
such deregulation of industry practices posed risks to public health and 
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threatened to subvert the entire system of FDA regulation (Radley, 
Finkelstein & Stafford 2006).  
Much as they did in the AWP context, prosecutors followed 
losses by industry critics in Congress by initiating a litigation campaign 
that attempted to force organizational change through lawsuits and 
settlements. The spark for this legal mobilization was an investigation 
of Pfizer's marketing of its epilepsy drug, Neurontin. Relying upon an 
innovative interpretation of the False Claims Act and state consumer 
protection statutes, prosecutors suggested that when Pfizer 
disseminated information to doctors about the off-label uses of the 
drug, it constituted illegal and "fraudulent" off-label marketing. Despite 
the untested nature of these claims, as well as the firm's insistence 
that the prosecutors were seeking to penalize truthful speech 
protected by the First Amendment, Pfizer agreed to a $430 million 
settlement in May 2004. In addition to the fine, the settlement 
contained regulatory provisions and mechanisms of legalized 
accountability similar to those in the AWP settlements (Pharmaceutical 
Law & Industry Report 2004a: 534).  
The Neurontin settlement served as a way to expand the scope 
of the conflict by drawing in additional attacks on pharmaceutical 
industry marketing practices. Following the Neurontin settlement, AG 
and class action litigation alleging off-label marketing fraud 
proliferated. Litigation has continued to the present, with drug firms 
collectively paying billions in fines and agreeing to various new 
corporate requirements (Osborn 2013). As with the AWP case, 
prosecutors also worked closely with federal agency lawyers on these 
cases. A particularly important partner has been the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), which has seen its power to oversee 
pharmaceutical marketing increase because of the investigations 
(Pagano 2009).  
The prosecutors' mobilization of the law against the prescription 
drug industry was also an attempt to establish new legal norms by 
"sending a message" that would resonate throughout the industry. 
While legal settlements in this and other contexts do not create formal 
legal precedents, they can prove invaluable in creating "business 
precedents" informally shaping the corporate landscape. The 
establishment of these business precedents led to the pharmaceutical 
industry's peak association adopting new voluntary guidelines, 
mirrored after recent settlements, aiming to help avoid liability for its 
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members (Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report 2007: 16). Several 
individual companies also announced reforms to their advertising 
practices to help them avoid future liability (Arnold 2008).  
 
Gun Control 
 
Another prominent effort of government litigators to use 
lawsuits and settlements to reshape the political status quo, coming 
directly in the wake of the tobacco settlement of 1998, was in the area 
of gun control. In October of 1998, attorneys representing the city of 
New Orleans filed a complaint against several gun manufacturers 
alleging that they defectively designed their handguns because they 
lacked safeguards preventing gun use by children or criminals (Morial 
v. Smith & Wesson Corp.). Shortly after, city attorneys for Chicago 
filed a lawsuit claiming that gun manufacturers had created a "public 
nuisance" by designing, manufacturing, marketing, and supplying their 
products in a way enabling a black market for illegal firearms within 
the Chicago city limits (Butterfield 1998).  
These two city lawsuits opened a floodgate of subsequent 
lawsuits against the gun industry, with over thirty municipalities 
eventually filing suit (Violence Policy Center). Government attorneys 
beyond the local level soon after joined the litigation campaign. In 
1999, Eliot Spitzer and Richard Blumenthal, the AGs of New York and 
Connecticut respectively, began investigations of several gun 
manufacturers. Andrew Cuomo, Clinton's Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), began working on a legal strategy 
mirroring many of the city lawsuits, alleging that gun manufacturers 
had not been properly supervising their distribution channels and had 
otherwise failed to promote gun safety (Walsh 1999). In December 
1999, President Clinton and Secretary Cuomo jointly announced that 
they were planning a lawsuit against gun manufacturers on behalf of 
3,200 public housing authorities across the country, based upon the 
notion that the actions of the gun manufacturers had increased federal 
expenditures (Stout & Perez-Pena 1999).  
The gun control litigation, like other recent nationwide litigation 
campaigns, aimed to force organizational change in the firearms 
industry. As New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial stated at the time: 
"money is not our primary aim. Changing the behavior and the 
practice of the gun industry is" (Koch 1999). Government prosecutors 
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used a variety of coordinated legal strategies to achieve a settlement 
seeking legalized accountability and requiring "more stringent 
regulation in an effort to keep guns out of the wrong hands" (Barrett 
2000). In March 2000, several of the public litigators reached a major 
settlement with Smith & Wesson, the largest manufacturer of 
handguns in the industry. The settlement contained numerous 
provisions relating to firearms safety and design, as well as several 
concerning the company's sales, marketing, and distribution practices. 
It also contained several provisions aimed at ensuring compliance, 
including requirements that the company designate a compliance 
officer tasked with ensuring adherence with the terms of the 
agreement (Smith & Wesson Settlement 2000:III(c)(1)-(3)).  
Second, the public gun litigation served to expand the scope of 
the conflict in a context in which advocates for stricter gun control 
were losing in other venues. Particularly after Republicans won control 
of Congress in the 1994 elections, federal gun control legislation faced 
little prospects for success. This litigation campaign served as an 
alternative way to achieve gun control policies. Like other campaigns, 
this conflict featured similar alliances between government litigators 
and federal bureaucracies, with state and local litigators working 
closely with HUD to achieve what the Clinton Administration and other 
gun control advocates had failed to achieve through legislative 
channels. Further, several private class-action attorneys and interest 
groups, often working in conjunction with government litigators, also 
sought to use litigation to control the gun industry. The Brady Center 
to Prevent Handgun Violence, a leading pro-gun control interest group, 
joined most of the city lawsuits against the gun industry and assisted 
the State of New York in its gun industry litigation (Tyler 1999). The 
Castano Group, a coalition of dozens of private class-action law firms 
that had worked with AGs on the tobacco litigation, also worked 
closely with public prosecutors (ibid).  
Finally, the gun litigation campaign was an attempt to establish 
new legal norms. Similar to what occurred in the tobacco litigation, the 
gun lawsuits framed industry actions as deceptive behavior that posed 
a threat to public health and budgets. This had some initial effects on 
the broader legal landscape. Prior to 1999, no private lawsuits had 
ever found a gun manufacturer liable for the criminal use of firearms. 
In February 1999, however, only a few months after the initial city 
lawsuits, a federal jury did just that. In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, a jury in 
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New York found 15 of the 25 manufacturers named in the suit liable 
under a "negligent marketing" theory, imposing damages on three of 
those companies. Several of the government lawsuits that went to trial 
following the Smith & Wesson settlement achieved at least some initial 
successes as well (City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 2002).  
Ultimately, however, this campaign failed to be the key turning 
point in the gun control debate as it initially appeared. A swift and 
overwhelmingly negative response from Smith & Wesson's customer 
base and the National Rifle Association prompted Smith & Wesson to 
back away from its agreement, and Congress enacted the Protection of 
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005 prohibiting most litigation 
against the gun industry. Despite its ultimate failure, however, this 
government-led litigation campaign illustrated a dynamic similar to 
other recent attempts to use government litigation to reshape 
corporate practices.  
 
Reform of Mortgage Lending Practices  
 
In 2000, AGs began investigating several mortgage lenders for 
allegedly engaging in "predatory lending" that targeted lower-income, 
elderly, and minority communities. These practices had long been the 
target of activists who had claimed that these loans acted as a 
financial trap for the most vulnerable citizens, turning the American 
dream into a nightmare. While only a few states specifically had anti-
predatory lending statutes on the books (Davenport 2003), state 
prosecutors suggested that practices in the subprime market might 
nevertheless violate the broad and vaguely worded prohibition of 
"unfair and deceptive acts" under general state consumer protection 
law.  
Despite the uncertainty of whether the lenders' conduct was 
actually illegal under existing law, the government litigators used their 
combined threat of widespread legal liability to leverage major 
settlements with members of industry aimed at forcing organizational 
change. In 2002, the government coalition, now joined by all fifty 
states, reached a $484 million settlement with mortgage giant 
Household Finance. The settlement required the company to adhere to 
several strict lending requirements, including limitations on 
prepayment penalties, new required consumer disclosures, and various 
other prohibitions and regulations. The settlement also sought 
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legalized accountability by establishing an "independent monitor" to 
oversee Household's compliance with the settlement and requiring 
employee training to ensure compliance with the agreement 
(Household Finance Consent Judgment 2002:24-28). These 
requirements went beyond anything required by the federal 
government or most states, effectively nationalizing many of the 
regulations similar to those industry critics unsuccessfully sought 
through state and federal legislative channels. These early efforts 
served as the framework for later settlements with the largest national 
lenders, including a $325 million settlement with Ameriquest and a 
landmark $8.68 billion settlement with Countrywide Financial 
(Ameriquest Multistate Settlement 2006:36-39; Countrywide 
Stipulated Judgment and Injunction 2008:22). In February 2012, 
federal and state prosecutors reached a $26 billion settlement with the 
nation's five largest mortgage servicers, which represented the largest 
single legal settlement since the tobacco settlement. The settlement, 
which sought to end "robo-signing" practices in the mortgage industry, 
continued the trend of requiring companies to adopt new training 
procedures and regulatory requirements to prevent activities not 
clearly illegal under existing law (National Foreclosure Consent 
Judgment 2012).  
The government litigation campaign also helped to expand the 
scope of the conflict. State and federal prosecutors created new 
national committees and working groups focused on lending issues 
throughout the 2000s, which served as a coordination mechanism not 
only for prosecutors but for numerous other interests as well. The 
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force created in 2009, for example, 
has served as a centralized entity coordinating enforcement efforts, 
training programs, and fraud data collection among numerous 
government agencies, consumer groups, legal aid attorneys, and 
others (Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force 2010). Additionally, 
private class-action litigation alleging lending abuses has used 
investigations by state litigators as part of building a narrative of 
criminal complicity, similar to the pharmaceutical litigation 
(Ameriquest Settlement Agreement 2009:4-5).  
Finally, the campaign has also helped to establish new legal 
norms concerning what constitutes "predatory lending." The legislative 
debate about bank regulation had proceeded along polarized frames of 
consumer welfare versus government interference with the free 
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market. Government prosecutors sought to re-frame the regulations 
achieved through settlements as necessary to "enforce the law" 
against lawbreaking corporate giants, which, as with re-
conceptualizing existing business practices as "fraudulent" in the 
pharmaceutical context, was a more acceptable way to achieve 
expanded government regulation than the existing polarized debate. 
The ambiguity of "predatory lending" granted government prosecutors 
the chance to shape its meaning through mobilizing the law against 
leading firms in the lending industry. The changing legal environment 
helped bolster legislative efforts to address lending practices. For 
example, California enacted a "Homeowner Bill of Rights" that 
incorporated and built upon the provisions in the government 
prosecutors' mortgage industry settlement in February 2012. This 
legislation applies the settlement's provisions to banks and other 
lenders not party to the original settlement (Lifsher & Lazo 2012). 
Additionally, recent congressional statutes and regulations targeting 
mortgage lending practices codified elements of previous settlements 
as a way of setting a federal floor for regulatory practices (Reckard 
2013).  
 
Conclusion  
 
Government litigation campaigns have proliferated in recent 
years and present several themes of interest to scholars of law and 
politics. These campaigns illustrate that legal mobilization is not only a 
way for political outsiders to challenge the state, but also serves as a 
powerful policy-making tool used by actors inside the state. Far from 
simply "enforcing the law," prosecutors have employed the 
instrumental and constitutive power of the law to force changes in 
organizational practices, expand the scope of the conflict over 
corporate responsibilities, and reshape existing legal norms through 
lawsuits and settlements. These activities illustrate how attention to 
legal processes unfolding across multiple political institutions can 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the role of law in 
social and political change.  
Further, the prevalence of government-led legal mobilization 
shows few signs of abating. Reflecting several parallel trends in 
American politics, private reform groups have increasingly collaborated 
with public litigators to mobilize the law. Intensifying political 
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polarization and congressional gridlock have made traditional policy 
making more difficult, leading advocates to seek policy change in other 
venues. At the same time, however, private litigators have found it 
increasingly difficult to access the legal system as Congress and the 
Supreme Court have curtailed opportunities for private litigators to sue 
corporations.  
In this political environment, prosecutors are a promising 
avenue for challenges to the status quo. As repeat players tasked with 
representing the "public interest," these institutional insiders maintain 
privileged access to the courts. Further, by couching widespread 
political changes in the apolitical language of law enforcement, 
prosecutors have gained support from across the 1 The following 
analysis of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP) case relies heavily upon 
the author's cataloguing of government lawsuits and settlements 
targeting the pharmaceutical industry. The main resource used for 
compiling this information was the Lexis-Nexis "United States News 
Verdicts, Settlements & Decisions" database. For each year from 1980 
to 2012, the following search string was used: [("average wholesale 
price" or AWP or ((drug! or pharmaceutical!) w/2 pric!)) and (litigation 
or "settlement & compromise" or "suits & claims" or verdicts or 
"decisions & rulings" or "consent decrees & orders" or investigations)]. 
Additional information about AWP litigation was collected as  
political system for changes that would otherwise be controversial. 
Given their shared goals of political change, increasingly 
disadvantaged private litigators have compelling reasons to ally with 
their powerful public counterparts.  
All of this suggests that scholars have much to gain by granting 
greater attention to the role of government law enforcement in the 
process of legal mobilization. While legal actions targeting corporate 
"fraud" may initially appear to have little to do with politics, especially 
since they are rarely resolved by high profile Supreme Court decisions, 
politics are in fact a central part of the story. Given the roadblocks to 
policy reform currently existing in the contemporary American political 
system, this form of legal mobilization has proven to be an 
increasingly important avenue for achieving widespread change 
through the law.  
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Notes: 
1 The following analysis of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP) case relies 
heavily upon the author's cataloguing of government lawsuits and 
settlements targeting the pharmaceutical industry. The main resource 
used for compiling this information was the Lexis-Nexis "United States 
News Verdicts, Settlements & Decisions" database. For each year from 
1980 to 2012, the following search string was used: [("average 
wholesale price" or AWP or ((drug! or pharmaceutical!) w/2 pric!)) and 
(litigation or "settlement & compromise" or "suits & claims" or verdicts 
or "decisions & rulings" or "consent decrees & orders" or 
investigations)]. Additional information about AWP litigation was 
collected as described in footnote 2 below. Following these searches, 
the author obtained settlement documents for each of the cases from 
the Web sites of individual AG offices as well as the federal DOJ and 
HHS. 
2 The information regarding states' AWP litigation in Table 1 was collected 
from a search of the Web sites of each of the fifty states' Attorney 
General offices, which typically contain a listing of legal complaints 
filed and/or press releases concerning new litigation. This search was 
supplemented with a search of the "All News" database within Lexis-
Nexis, starting with the terms "Average Wholesale Price" and 
"Alabama" and subsequently continuing through all fifty states.  
3 A listing of the various cases the Hagens Berman law firm has been involved 
in is available on the firm's Web site, http://www.hbsslaw.com/cases-
and-investigations (accessed February 26, 2014).  
4 According to PAL's Web site, this includes Hagens Berman, the same 
plaintiffs' firm that has worked closely with AGs on several AWP cases 
(Prescription Access Litigation).  
5 Contained within the NAACP's broader law-based fight for racial justice was, 
for example, a contest between civil rights pioneers Thurgood Marshall 
and Carter Wesley for leadership in the black community (Tushnet 
2005).  
6 A press release issued by Louisiana's AG following a 2012 AWP settlement 
with several drug companies provides a typical example: "I will, as 
Attorney General, continue to aggressively pursue pharmaceutical 
companies who defraud our Medicaid program. We are sending a 
message to drug companies that their fraud will not be tolerated in 
Louisiana" (Office of the Attorney General of Louisiana 2012).  
7 Problems with AWP have been mentioned at least in passing in dozens of 
congressional hearings beginning in 2001, with major hearings 
discussing AWP at length occurring nearly every year since.   
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Table 1: The Progression of State AWP Lawsuits 
 
State  Date Filed  Defendants  
Texas  September 2000  Dey Laboratories, Schering-Plough, and Roxane  
West Virginia  October 2001  Schering-Plough and Abbott Labs  
Nevada  January 2002  12 defendants  
Montana  February 2002  18 defendants  
Minnesota  June 2002  Pharmacia  
New York  February 2003  Pharmacia and GlaxoSmithKline  
Connecticut  March 2003  7 defendants  
Florida  July 2003  3 defendants  
Kentucky  September 2003  5 defendants  
Massachusetts  September 2003  13 defendants  
Arkansas  January 2004  4 defendants  
Ohio  March 2004  5 defendants  
Pennsylvania  March 2004  13 defendants  
Wisconsin  June 2004  20 defendants  
Alabama  January 2005  73 defendants  
Illinois  February 2005  48 defendants  
Missouri  May 2005  Dey and Warrick  
California  August 2005  39 defendants  
Mississippi  October 2005  86 defendants  
Arizona  December 2005  42 defendants  
Hawaii  April 2006  44 defendants  
South Carolina  August 2006  5 defendants  
Idaho  June 2007  10 defendants  
Utah  September 2007  10 defendants  
Iowa  October 2007  78 defendants  
Kansas  November 2008  17 defendants  
Louisiana  November 2010  18 defendants  
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Figure 1:  
The Role of AWP in Government Prescription Drug 
Reimbursements 
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